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Abstract
Background: Computerized physician order entry systems (CPOE) can reduce the number of medication errors
and adverse drug events (ADEs) in healthcare institutions. Unfortunately, they tend to produce a large number of
partly irrelevant alerts, in turn leading to alert overload and causing alert fatigue. The objective of this work is to
identify factors that can be used to prioritize and present alerts depending on the ‘context’ of a clinical situation.
Methods: We used a combination of literature searches and expert interviews to identify and validate the possible
context factors. The internal validation of the context factors was performed by calculating the inter-rater
agreement of two researcher’s classification of 33 relevant articles.
Results: We developed a context model containing 20 factors. We grouped these context factors into three
categories: characteristics of the patient or case (e.g. clinical status of the patient); characteristics of the
organizational unit or user (e.g. professional experience of the user); and alert characteristics (e.g. severity of the
effect). The internal validation resulted in nearly perfect agreement (Cohen’s Kappa value of 0.97).
Conclusion: To our knowledge, this is the first structured attempt to develop a comprehensive context model for
prioritizing drug safety alerts in CPOE systems. The outcome of this work can be used to develop future tailored
drug safety alerting in CPOE systems.
Background
Medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs)
“Errare humanum est - To err is human“. This famous
quotation, derived from Cicero and Seneca the Elder, is
universally applicable, including medicine. Medication
errors have been identified to be a common type of
medical errors [1]. The Institute of Medicine reports
that a hospital patient can expect to be subject to at
least one medication error per day [2].
Medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs) can
occur during every step of the medication use process
[2-4]. The Council of Europe defines a medication error
as “any preventable event that may cause or lead to inap-
propriate medication use or patient harm while the medi-
cation is in the control of the health care professional,
patient or consumer” [3] (p.7) and an ADE as “any injury
occurring during the patient’s drug therapy and resulting
either from appropriate care or from unsuitable or subop-
timal care” [3] (p.1). ADEs associated with a medication
error are considered to be preventable ADEs [2,3].
A further breakdown of medication errors into the five
stages of the medication use process, which are pre-
scribing, transcribing/documenting, dispensing, adminis-
tering, and monitoring, allows the identification of
error-prone steps. 39% [1] of all medication errors and
56% [5] - 71% [6] of preventable ADEs occur in the pre-
scription phase.
CPOE to prevent medication errors and ADEs
There is evidence for the effectiveness of computerized
physician order entry (CPOE) in hospital settings in
reducing medication errors as well as ADEs [2,7-10].
CPOE systems can be equipped with further clinical
decision support (CDS). Kuperman et al. distinguishes
between basic (e.g. offers drug-drug interaction check-
ing) and advanced (e.g. includes advanced guidance for
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laboratory testing) medication-related decision support
[11]. A systematic review performed in 2008 reported a
higher relative risk reduction of medication errors of
systems with advanced CDS compared to CPOE systems
with limited or no CDS [8].
CPOE and the challenge of alert fatigue
When a CPOE system is equipped with CDS, the burden
of alert-handling has to be considered. As research
shows, drug safety alerts as well as reminders from CDS
systems are often disregarded by the prescribers. A
review paper in 2006 reported alert override-rates of 49%
to 96% [12]. Especially drug-drug interaction (DDI) and
drug-allergy checking suffers from low specificity due to
too many false positive warnings which results in high
override-rates [11,12]. However, in general, all types of
CDS-triggered warnings are frequently overridden [12].
Alert fatigue is a frequent complaint about CPOE sys-
tems with CDS [12-14]. An increasing number of drug
safety alerts has the potential for user desensitization
[15]. This desensitization leads to an override of both
important (even highly important) and unimportant
warnings [12]. In this work we focus on the definition
of van der Sijs [16] who describes alert fatigue as the
mental state that is the result of alerts consuming too
much time and mental energy, which can cause relevant
alerts to be unjustifiably overridden along with clinically
unimportant ones. Synonyms used for the term alert
fatigue are ‘cry wolf syndrome’ and ‘pop-up fatigue’ [15].
A systematic review by Khajouei et al. of the design
aspects of CPOE systems reported eight studies investi-
gating the impact of specificity, sensitivity, unclear infor-
mation content, and timing of warnings on creating
conditions for medication errors [14]. This review
showed that low alert specificity/sensitivity and unclear
information content can induce alert fatigue.
A context-aware CPOE system
Suggestions to improve the specificity of drug safety
alerts such as patient-tailored drug safety alerts can be
embraced by the term ‘context’.
In computer science, ‘context’ refers to the idea of sys-
tems sensing and reacting based on their environment.
Within this work, the following definition from the area
of ubiquitous computing is used: “Context is any infor-
mation that can be used to characterize the situation of
an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is
considered relevant to the interaction between a user and
an application, including the user and applications them-
selves” [17] (p.3). A system using ‘context’ tries to make
assumptions about the current situation and circum-
stances. Dey further designates a system as a context-
aware system “if it uses context to provide relevant infor-
mation and/or services to the user, where relevancy
depends on the user’s task” [17] (p.4). According to this
declaration, context-aware CPOE systems provide:
• Relevant information: for example, context-aware
CPOE may prioritize drug safety alerts in order to
present them in an adequate manner (life-threaten-
ing alerts interrupt the prescribing process of the
user and cannot be ignored; in contrary, less relevant
alerts are not interrupting the user)
• Relevant services: for example, context-aware
CPOE may give reminders for regular laboratory
monitoring or may offer drug dosing support.
Figure 1 schematically shows the concept of drug pre-
scription within a CPOE system that prioritizes and pre-
sents drug safety alerts depending on the clinical context.
The European PSIP project (Patient Safety through
Intelligent Procedures in medication, http://www.psip-
project.eu) develops, among others, innovative and CDS
systems to increase medication safety during prescrip-
tion. In the PSIP project, the frequency of ADEs has
been analysed for individual medical departments or
hospitals. Based upon this knowledge, a rule-based CDS
system has been developed [18]. However, so far it has
not been exhaustively studied which possible context
factors could be used to improve the specificity and sen-
sitivity of drug safety alerts.
Study question
• What are possible factors that can help to priori-
tize and present drug safety alerts in CPOE systems
according to the given context?
Methods
The methods used during the creation of the context
model can be grouped into three major parts: a factor
identification phase, a model generation phase and a
model validation phase (see Figure 2).
Phase 1: Identification of context factors
We combined a literature search with expert interviews
to identify the possible context factors that might be
used to prioritize and present drug safety alerts.
Literature search
The literature search aimed at identifying articles deal-
ing with contextualization or the improvement of drug
safety alerting in CPOE systems. Two different search
strategies were applied:
First, as a starting point, a hand search was per-
formed to extract ideas for contextualized drug safety
alerts in CPOE systems which focused on ten journals
in the field of health informatics (for a list of all hand-
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searched journals see additional files 1). Two researchers
(MJ and DR) carried out this search at the end of Febru-
ary 2010. References of the found papers were followed
in order to identify further papers. The researchers also
retrieved related articles of found papers, as identified
by this function in PubMed.
Second, a PubMed search was conducted comprising
two search queries (see Table 1):
• The specific search (A) used MeSH terms to
search for CPOE-related articles.
• The topical search (B) on the general term “CPOE”
discovered CPOE-related articles that have not been
MeSH-indexed so far.
To reduce the number of hits, these two CPOE-
related terms were combined with keywords regarding
the alert optimization, alert number, and alert response
(see Table 1).
Both researchers individually reviewed the abstracts of
the found articles. Irrelevant papers were excluded if they
did not contain any ideas that could be used for contex-
tualized prioritization of CPOE alerts. All the relevant
articles were included for full-text review and again read
individually by both researchers. In order to extract pos-
sible context factors the researchers looked for correla-
tions between the rates of overridden alerts and specific
variables, for example, the number of years a doctor
worked in the healthcare organization [19]. Furthermore,
ideas for context factors were extracted if the authors of
the papers suggested to tailor the alerts according to cer-
tain factors (for example, the complexity of the clinical
case [20]) or aimed to increase the specificity and sensi-
tivity of alerts by certain ‘contextual’ adaptations [12].
ͻInterview 
CPOE experts
ͻPerform 
literature 
search
1. Factor 
identifi-
cation
ͻGroup 
factors
ͻAssign one 
example to 
each factor
2. Model 
generation
ͻRead  full 
text articles
ͻCompute 
Cohen's 
Kappa
3. Model 
validation
Figure 2 Major phases in the development and validation of the context model.
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Figure 1 A context-aware CPOE system. Depending on the prescription, the rule engine of the CDS system generates raw alerts (e.g. drug-
drug interaction between acetylsalicylic acid and an anticoagulant). These raw alerts are then prioritized based on context information (e.g. the
dose, the age of the patient, any co-medication, or information on user or clinical department). Afterwards, the alerts are presented differently to
the user according to their priority (e.g. life-threatening alerts interrupt the prescribing process and cannot be overridden).
Riedmann et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:35
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/35
Page 3 of 11
A detailed flowchart of the performed literature search
is shown in the following illustration (see Figure 3).
Expert interviews
We performed qualitative interviews with leading interna-
tional experts in the field of CPOE. We created a ranked
list of experts on the basis of their number of publications
as first named authors regarding CPOE-related papers
(using the search terms “CPOE” in all fields and “medical
order entry systems”, “computer-assisted drug therapy”,
and “clinical decision support system” as major MeSH-
headings within PubMed). First, we invited the authors
with the most publications. We planned five interviews as
a minimum and intended to conduct more interviews
depending on the level of saturation, which means that
data are collected until no new information can be
retrieved [21]. In the end we conducted five interviews.
Saturation was reached as the interviewed experts did not
identify any new factors. When selecting the interview
partners, we took care to ensure that none of them had
any direct affiliation with the PSIP project.
The expert interviews were conducted using a semi-
structured interview guideline. The interviewees were
informed in advance by a description of our concept (cf.
description of Figure 1) and the main interview question:
“Question: What could be the most important context
factors that can be used for the prioritization of
alerts?”
The telephone interviews were planned to take about
20 minutes. All the interviews were recorded and tran-
scribed using summarized conversation protocols.
Phase 2: Generation of context model
The extracted context factors from the literature search
and the semi-structured interviews were generalized and
hierarchically organized. To organize the factors we
made use of an inductive category development accord-
ing to Mayring [22]. Furthermore, for each context fac-
tor a generic definition and a specific example was
generated. To collaboratively develop this context model
we used an online brainstorming and mind map model-
ing tool.
Phase 3: Validation of context model
The research team performed a first internal validation.
Both researchers (MJ and DR) read all of the 33 full text
articles that were found. Passages within those papers
that indicated the contextualization of drug safety alerts
were then independently classified using the final con-
text model. The inter-researcher agreement for all text
passages discovered by both researchers was determined
by computing Cohen’s Kappa coefficient. Disagreements
in the classifications were put to discussion.
Results
The context model
The final context model is the result of the performed
literature search and the five semi-structured expert
interviews. In the interviews, five CPOE experts (having
published between 3 and 13 CPOE-related articles on
PubMed) agreed to participate (three from North Amer-
ica and two from Europe). They mentioned 12 possible
context factors. In the literature search, 33 papers were
identified that named 20 possible context factors,
including the 12 factors named by the experts.
Table 1 Search terms for the factor extraction phase
Specific PubMed search (A) Topical PubMed search (B)
Decision Support Systems, Clinical [MeSH]
Drug Therapy, Computer-Assisted [MeSH]
Medical Order Entry Systems [MeSH]
CPOE [Title/Abstract]
Publication date from September 2009 to present
AND
Alert optimization Alert number Alert response
alert [Title/Abstract] alert [Title/Abstract] alert [Title/Abstract]
adopt/adopting/adoption fatigue compliant/compliance
specific/specificity overload override/overriding
prioritisation/prioritization reduce/reducing/reduction adherence/non-adherence
filter/filtering over-alerting [Title/Abstract] handling
improve/improving OR OR user [Title/Abstract]
helpful satisfaction
customize/customizing/customization alert/user [Title/Abstract]
appropriate/inappropriate acceptance
clinical/ly response/responsiveness
significant/significance human factors [Title/Abstract]
relevant/relevance
MeSH terms are in bold.
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Table 2 lists all the identified context factors, together
with an explanation. The found 20 context factors are
grouped into three main categories (see also Figure 4).
1. Characteristics of the organizational unit
Drug safety alerts can be prioritized based on the
characteristics of the organizational unit. These
context factors can affect three organization
levels of health care: the entire hospital, a special
hospital department, or an individual CPOE user.
For example, certain types of alerts may be dis-
abled for a specialized department, or a user
with a lot of experience may want less intrusive
alerts for a special group of drugs.
2. Characteristics of the patient/case
Information on the patient case can help to
improve the tailoring of warnings. For example,
recent lab values or known diagnoses may be
taken into account when prioritizing alerts.
3. Characteristics of the alert
Warnings in CPOE systems can also be contextua-
lized on the basis of alert characteristics. For exam-
ple, alerts pointing to the possibility of less serious
ADEs may be presented in a less intrusive way.
Excluded because abstracts do not 
contain context information (N=157) 
N=33 
N=67 
N=224 
Hand search 
(Magazines, PubMed 
related articles) 
N=61 
Specific PubMed search 
(A) 
N=174 
Excluded because full texts do not 
contain context information (N=34) 
Topical PubMed search 
(B) 
N=10 
Hand search 
N=32 
Specific PubMed search 
N=45 
Topical PubMed search 
N=4 
Hand search 
N=21 
Specific PubMed search 
N=24 
Topical PubMed search 
N=0 
UNION 
N=33 
N=67 
Figure 3 Flowchart of literature search to elicit articles describing factors for the contextualization of CPOE alerts. Due to overlaps
between the three search strategies, the sums of papers in each line do not coincide with the number of papers provided after combining the
results of the three searches.
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Table 2 List of extracted context factors including definition and one example for each factor
Definition Example
ADE rate of the department/hospital
The total number of ADEs which occur in the
department/hospital.
If a department/hospital has a low rate of a specific ADE, don’t show
the corresponding alerts.
Population of the hospital
The epidemiological characteristics of the patient
population from the geographical catchment area of the
hospital.
Show more alerts for increased risk of liver destruction when the
prevalence for liver diseases is high in the area of the hospital.
Professional experience of the user
Years of working experience; degree and the position in
the hierarchy.
A senior physician receives fewer alerts than a resident.
Repetition of alerts
The number of times a specific alert is presented to the
user.
An alert is only shown to a doctor once a day or an alert is never
shown twice for the same patient (e.g. after renewal of a prescription).
Organizational
unit
Current task of the user
The current step in the medication workflow
(prescription, dispensation, administration).
Show all alerts during prescription, but only the most severe alerts
during administration.
Personal preferences of the user
Individual customization of the alerts depending on the
user’s needs or preferences.
A doctor can turn off certain alerts if he or she doesn’t want them.
Override-rate of alerts
The frequency a specific alert gets overridden by a
specific user or department-/hospital-wide.
An alert won’t be shown again to a doctor if he/she has already
overridden it several times.
Specialty
The specialist field of the user or the special field of the
department/hospital.
A psychiatrist receives different alerts than a surgeon.
Workload
The number of patients to care for, the staffing of the
department, the duration of the shift or the time of the
day.
Certain alerts that might be overlooked should be highlighted when
the doctor is working for more than 8 h.
Demographic data of the patient
The sex, age and ethnicity of the patient.
Show certain alerts only for patients older than 60 years.
Patient/Case Risk factors of the patient
A certain genetic disposition, alcoholism, obesity or
under-nutrition.
Show specific alerts only for alcoholics.
Tolerance of the drug
The case history of the patient shows that he/she
tolerates a drug.
Don’t show alerts for the possible side effects of aspirin, if the patient
hasn’t developed any of these in a previous case.
Complexity of the case
The number of clinical conditions and multi-morbidities
of a patient or the number of applied drugs.
Certain alerts that might be overlooked should be highlighted in case
that the patient has more than 5 chronic clinical conditions or if he
takes more than 5 different drugs at the same time.
Clinical status of the patient
The type of disease, the severity or stadium of the
disease or clinical parameters (e.g. lab values).
Show specific alerts only if the patient suffers from renal diseases or
when a lab value reaches a critical threshold.
Class of drug
The group of the prescribed drug (e.g. narcotics,
anticoagulants) relating to the possible damage it may
cause.
Highlight specific alerts only for classes of drugs with a high ADE
potential (e.g. corticosteroids).
Alert Severity of the effect
The seriousness of the potential effect.
Don’t show alerts when the expected effect may cause no or only
minor patient harm.
Probability of occurrence
The probability of occurrence of the expected ADE.
When prescribing an anticoagulant, show an alert only if the
probability of internal bleeding is higher than 5%.
Strength of evidence
The strength of the scientific evidence of a certain effect.
Don’t show alerts if only one non-randomized study reports this
certain effect.
Topicality of the alert
How long a certain alert is in the system or the time
since the last update of an alert.
Highlight alerts that are new in the system.
Type of alert
The type of drug interaction (e.g. drug-drug interaction,
drug-allergy interaction) that may occur.
Don’t show drug-allergy alerts if allergies are not sufficiently
documented in the patient records of the hospital.
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Support for each context factor
From the 33 full text articles that were judged to be
relevant in the literature search, the researchers
identified an overall number of 133 text passages
indicating the contextualization of drug safety alerts.
Table 3 gives an overview of the number of text pas-
sages per context factors, with each passage either
supporting or opposing a factor. Table 4 gives an
overview of the 12 factors mentioned in the expert
interviews.
Internal model validation
Of those mutually found 133 text passages, 100 were
individually found by both researchers (MJ and DR). For
these 100 text passages, Cohen’s Kappa was  = 0.97
(for details see additional files).
Discussion
Answer to the study question
Based on a broad literature search and expert interviews,
we identified 20 factors that could be used to
Figure 4 Mind map of the final context model grouped in three categories.
Table 3 Literature support for each factor of the context model
Context factor Pros (+) Cons (-) N
ADE rate of the department/hospital [12,27] 2
Population of the hospital [15] 1
Professional experience of the user [12,15,20,23,24,27-31] [12,19] 12
Organizational unit Repetition of alerts [11,12,14,20,27,29,31-35] 11
Current task of the user [11,14,19,33] 4
Personal preferences of the user [15,27,31,36,37] [31,34] 7
Override-rate of alerts [11,15,31] 3
Specialty [11,12,15,23,27,28,38] [35] 8
Workload [12,19,39] [29] 4
Demographic data of the patient [12,19,20,27,29-31,37,38,40] [29,35] 12
Risk factors of the patient [12,24] 2
Patient/Case Tolerance of the drug [12,15,20,31,35-37,40,41] 9
Complexity of the case [19,20,37,40] [35] 5
Clinical status of the patient [12,19,27,29,33,35,37,38] 8
Class of drug [15,31,35,40,42] [41] 6
Alert Severity of the effect [11,12,20,24,31,35,40,41,43-46] [12,23,31,33,37,46] 18
Probability of occurrence [24,44] 2
Strength of evidence [11,20,24,27,33,40,47] 7
Topicality of the alert [28,41] 2
Type of alert [12,20,35,40,41,48-50] [19,51] 10
∑ 133
“Pros” are references which positively discuss the given factor. “Cons” are references which negatively discuss the given factor. N gives the overall number of
cases a factor has been discussed.
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contextualize drug safety alerts in CPOE systems. From
the final 20 factors, 12 were mentioned during the
expert interviews. Most factors that were named by
more than one expert were also more intensively dis-
cussed in the literature (cf. Table 3 and Table 4). A pos-
sible explanation for this might be that there was an
overlap between the authors of the papers found in the
literature search and the CPOE experts invited for the
telephone interviews (three out of five interviewees also
appeared as authors of analysed papers).
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
As strength, we combined interviews with a literature
search during the development of the context model (cf.
Figure 2). A literature search, which does not claim to be
a systematic review, dominated the phase of factor
extraction. We neither rated the type of article (RCT ver-
sus opinion paper) nor the section where the context
information was gathered from (e.g. result vs. discussion).
We cannot be sure that we identified all context factors
ever discussed in the literature. However, as the inter-
viewed experts did not identify other factors that we have
found in the literature search, our list sufficiently reflects
the state of scientific discussion at the moment.
The validation of the context model was conducted by
the same two researchers who were involved in the
model creation. This might explain the high Cohen’s
Kappa value of 0.97. Disagreements occurred in cases
where the definitions of context factors only differ
slightly. For instance, the definition of the factors
‘repetition of alerts’ (same alert shown frequently to the
same user) and ‘override-rate of alerts’ (alerts overridden
frequently by one user/all users from one department/all
users from the hospital) only differ in the action the
user takes when the alert is triggered (cf. Table 2). This
could be seen in one non-agreement (see additional
files).
We grouped the found 20 factors into three categories
- naturally, other ways of groupings would be possible.
The final context model includes factors that differ in
the level of abstraction. While the definitions of some
context factors are very narrow (e.g. override-rate of
alerts), others are more general (e.g. clinical status of
the patient). This mostly reflects the different level of
detail of the discussion in the literature, but also points
to the need to limit the number of context factors by
aggregating them.
No formal validation of completeness or external vali-
dation of the context model has been done yet.
Results in relation to other studies
According to our knowledge, the developed context
model is the first attempt to systematically reveal and
structure ‘context’ that can be used for the prioritization
of drug safety alerts. Some of the factors have been used
within suggestions for alert improvement. For instance,
van der Sijs et al. [23] (p.446) suggested that drug safety
alerts might be improved if they were customized to pro-
fessional experience, but also warned about turning off
alerts for experts because of errors due to lack of atten-
tion, distraction, and forgetfulness. Sittig et al. [19], how-
ever, concluded in his study that there was no indication
that users of different level of experience differed in their
decisions to accept or ignore various CDS features. This
example shows that tailoring alerts according to the pro-
fessional experience is not consistently seen in the litera-
ture. A promising approach from our point of view is to
tier alerts according to the level of severity which is,
among others, also pursued by Paterno et al. [24]. She
concluded that a tiered presentation of DDI alerts led to
higher compliance rates of the physicians. A potential
way to determine the level of severity of an alert is pro-
vided by the ‘Medication Error Index’ by the National
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting
and Prevention, which provides a classification according
to the severity of the outcome of a medication error [25].
Further studies are needed to better understand the feasi-
bility of using each context factor for alert optimization,
as well as the effect when using it.
Meaning and generalizability of the study
The serious problem of alert overload causing alert fati-
gue and the ways to improve drug safety alerting in
CPOE systems is a current issue [14].
Table 4 Results of the quantitative content analysis of
the semi-structured telephone interviews (N = 5
interviews)
Context factor N
Organizational unit
Personal preferences of the user 2
Specialty 2
Current task of the user 1
Override-rate of alerts 1
Repetition of alerts 1
Patient/Case
Clinical status of the patient 4
Demographic data of the patient 4
Risk factors of the patient 1
Complexity of the case 1
Tolerance of the drug 1
Alert
Severity of the effect 3
Strength of evidence 1
∑ 22
N ... Number of interviewees who mentioned the context factor
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Some of the presented context factors are already in
use or may be considered in the development of future
CPOE and CDS systems. For instance, within the PSIP
project, the CDS system uses information on the diagno-
sis and lab values of a patient to trigger drug safety alerts.
However, for the implementation of several context
factors into a real-world scenario, multiple preconditions
have to be fulfilled in advance. For example, organiza-
tional (e.g. unique drug naming, international drug-
interaction database, etc.), technical (e.g. data integra-
tion, standardization, etc.), and human (e.g. physicians’
acceptance, etc.) aspects have to be taken into account.
The long-term experience with the Dutch drug data-
base G-standard is now being used in the International
Health Terminology Standards Development Organisa-
tion (IHTSDO) for the development of a good structure
and unequivocal pharmaceutical information in
SNOMED CT (Systematized Nomenclature of Medi-
cine-Clinical Terms). In many countries, different com-
mercial databases are used, and people are afraid of
turning off alerts because of legal consequences. A
shared international database could probably be used as
a professional standard for those alerts that should be
generated and those that can be turned off [23].
With respect to human factors, however, much is still
unknown. It is unclear as to how the alerts of different
severity and type (drug-interaction, duplicate order, or
overdose) should be presented to the user (which colors,
which form, which place on the screen, and whether
visual or auditory signals should be used). The preferred
order and length of the text components in the alert
text is unknown, and which information should be avail-
able only in the background.
Unanswered and new questions
The identified set of context factors for alert prioritiza-
tion is proposed as a starting point for effective alerting
in CPOE systems. At the moment, however, it is unclear
which of the presented 20 context factors should be
taken into account when triggering a drug safety alert.
To address this unanswered question, a user survey
among European physicians and a Delphi study among
international CPOE experts has been conducted [26].
Another issue that should be dealt with in the future is
the most effective combination of context factors. This
could be subject of an international multi-disciplinary
workshop of CPOE experts, users (physicians and pharma-
cists) as well as industry partners. The effectiveness should
then be evaluated in subsequent experimental studies.
Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to structure
and validate possible context factors for alert optimiza-
tion within CPOE systems. The ideas and concepts that
have evolved throughout this work need further valida-
tion and clinical evaluation.
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agreement for 100 text passages indicating the contextualization of drug
safety alerts that were individually found by the researchers.
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